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Researchers have long studied the reaction of foreign exchange returns to macroeconomic
announcements in order to infer changes in policy reaction functions and foreign exchange micro  -
structure, including the speed of market reaction to news and how order flow helps impound
public and private information into prices. These studies have often been disconnected, however;
and this article critically reviews and evaluates the literature on announcement effects on foreign
exchange returns. (JEL F31, F32, G14) 
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because the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH)
implies that asset prices should react directly
and quickly to the surprise component of any
announcement.2 Thus, asset price reactions
inform us about how markets form expectations
of future fundamentals. Hardouvelis (1988) draws
an analogy between research on the effect of
macroeconomic announcements and controlled
experiments.
The open-economy macro models of the
1970s, which focused on monetary determinants
of exchange rates (e.g., Dornbusch, 1976), moti-
vated the study of how money supply and interest
rate announcements affected foreign exchange
rates. For example, Cornell (1982) and Engel and
Frankel (1984) used exchange rate responses to
evaluate the evidence for how money supply
shocks cause individuals to revise their expecta-
tions of inflation and future monetary policy.
S
ince the early 1980s researchers have
sought to understand how foreign
exchange markets react to various
announcements. The motivation for
studying this topic is a fundamental goal of
economics: to understand the determination of
prices. The study of announcement effects has
lessons for both macroeconomics and microstruc-
ture. This paper surveys and summarizes the
lengthy literature that has tenaciously built up
a picture of how macroeconomic and policy
announcements affect exchange rate returns.1
Announcement reactions reveal market per-
ceptions of policy and how such policies change
over time and between countries. They provide a
unique window into how the economy operates
1 A related paper, Neely (2010b), surveys the literature on how for-
eign exchange volatility responds to macroeconomic announce-
ments, including discontinuous reactions. Osler (2009) surveys
the foreign exchange microstructure literature, including papers
that focus on announcement effects. A chapter in Evans (2010)
also reviews some of the issues in the literature on announcement
effects on foreign exchange returns.
2 Conveniently, survey expectations exist that allow us to decom-
pose most announcements into their expected and unexpected
components. 
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St. Louis.Meese and Rogoff’s (1983) failure to forecast
exchange rates with a variety of macro variables
further motivated researchers to study a broader
array of macro announcements. By creating the
widespread impression that exchange rates are
“disconnected” from the broader economy, Meese
and Rogoff (1983) strongly motivated researchers
to link exchange rates to macroeconomic variables,
as a first step toward comprehensive macroeco-
nomic exchange rate modeling. 
Analyzing foreign exchange reactions to
announcements can inform us how market per-
ceptions of policy rules or other factors change.
Specifically, Hardouvelis (1984) and Hakkio and
Pearce (1985) assess the Federal Reserve’s chang-
ing inflation-fighting credibility by examining the
reactions of exchange rates and interest rates to
M1 innovations. International variation in reac-
tions to announcements can similarly tell us about
market expectations. For example, Love and Payne
(2008) find that the USD/GBP exchange rate is
more sensitive to the surprise component of U.S.
inflation announcements than to that of the United
Kingdom. The authors conjecture that market
participants expect the Bank of England—which
is an explicit inflation targeter—to bring inflation
back down to the target. Alternatively, U.S. infla-
tion shocks might simply have a larger effect on
risk premia than do U.K. inflation shocks.
Cross-country institutional differences can
also illuminate the importance of institutional
details for outcomes. For example, U.S. macro-
economic announcements are regular and sched-
uled while Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998)
report that German announcements were not
scheduled in the 1992-94 sample.3 These authors
found that the unscheduled German announce-
ments had a smaller and more prolonged impact
on exchange rates. Reactions to scheduled
announcements might be quicker because agents
have had time to form expectations and plan
actions in response to the surprise component. 
The reaction to scheduled versus unscheduled
announcements is only one example of how the
literature has illuminated the microstructure of
the foreign exchange market. Ederington and Lee
(1995), for example, determined that the system-
atic reaction to announcements took no more
than 40 seconds. Doukas (1985) was the first to
suggest that the order of related announcements
was important. More recently, the literature has
begun to seriously explore how public informa-
tion (an announcement) creates trading (order
flow) that reveals private information. Order flow
has a greater price impact after announcements
and contributes to a response that can last for days
(Evans and Lyons, 2002 and 2005). 
In short, the literature on exchange rate
responses to macroeconomic announcements
has learned a great deal about market perceptions
of policy reaction functions and the microstruc-
ture of foreign exchange markets. Unfortunately,
the papers tend to be disconnected from each
other, making it difficult to see broad themes.
This paper attempts to remedy that situation by
reviewing the literature on announcement effects
on exchange rate returns and linking those works
to broader points.
The next section of the article briefly discusses
the most commonly studied U.S. announcements,
and the rest of the paper reviews the major areas
of research on the effects of announcements on the
conditional means of foreign exchange returns. 
U.S. MACROECONOMIC
ANNOUNCEMENTS
Several factors facilitate the study of U.S.
announcement effects on foreign exchange rates.
U.S. announcements are scheduled and expecta-
tions of those announcements and accompanying
exchange rate data are widely available. Thus, the
literature has devoted disproportionate attention
to U.S. announcements. Table 1 displays a number
of commonly used U.S. announcements, as well
as their source and the delay in their release.
Other papers, such as Andersen et al. (2003),
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005), and Faust et al.
Neely and Dey
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3 Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998) describe the time of German
announcements as “not regular” and obtain specific times from
Reuter’s reports. They cite the transition from West German to
unified German data as causing some irregularity in trade balance
announcements. Andersen et al. (2003) report that markets had
advance warning of the days but not the times of German macro
announcements for their March 1993 to December 1998 sample. (2007) also provide summary information on the
releases they use.
Fama’s (1970) semi-strong form EMH has
guided researchers in connecting exchange rates
to macroeconomic fundamentals. This hypothesis
states that current prices reflect publicly available
information to the extent that one cannot make a
risk-adjusted profit by trading on the basis of that
information (Jensen, 1978). Because at least some
market participants continually gather informa-
tion, develop expectations of macroeconomic con-
ditions, and trade on those beliefs, asset prices
should always approximately reflect the marginal
investor’s current expectations and prices should
quickly react only to the surprise component of
an announcement at the time of the release.4 Any
systematic delay in the market reaction or system-
atic response to the expected component of the
release would provide a profit opportunity and
therefore should not exist. To test this no-risk-
arbitrage hypothesis, researchers require good
estimates of market expectations of the announce-
ment and high-frequency data to precisely estimate
the systematic response and to judge its speed.
Fortunately, such data were available very early
for U.S. announcements, which helps explain the
attention that they received.5 Researchers gener-
ally use the median response from the Money
Market Services (MMS) survey to estimate the
expected announcement. Each Friday, MMS sur-
veys 40 money managers on their expectations of
economic indicators.6 (Ideally, the surveys would
be conducted as close as possible to the announce-
ment time to more precisely estimate the market’s
expectation at the time of the announcement.)
Cornell (1982) and Engel and Frankel (1984)
first used these survey data in the literature on
announcement effects in the foreign exchange
market, though other researchers—for example,
Grossman (1981)—had used them in other con-
texts. Grossman (1981), Engel and Frankel (1984),
Pearce and Roley (1985), and McQueen and Roley
(1993) showed that the MMS survey data provide
approximately unbiased and informationally
efficient estimates of news announcements that
outperform time-series models.7 These MMS sur-
vey measures of announcement expectations
soon became standard.
Certain sets of U.S. announcements contain
highly correlated information, such as the
Conference Board and the University of Michigan
consumer confidence indices. Doukas (1985) was
probably the first researcher to note that timing
among related releases matters. He speculated that
U.S. monetary announcements were more impor-
tant than Canadian monetary announcements
because they were released 50 minutes earlier.
Tandon and Urich (1987) made a similar observa-
tion about U.S. PPI and CPI news. Andersen et al.
(2003) show that markets typically react most
strongly to the surprise component of the earliest
release within a set of related U.S. announcements.
Although the vast majority of announcements
are backward looking—they pertain to previous
economic activity—monetary policy announce-
ments are forward looking: The Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) considers all available
information, including forecasts and the latest
announcements, when making decisions about
short-term interest rates.8 The FOMC meets eight
Neely and Dey
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4 There are at least two caveats to this statement: (i) Pre-announcement
prices might reflect not only the investor’s expectation but also
some adjustment for risk; (ii) an announcement whose content
matches market expectations can affect prices and volatility by
removing uncertainty. These effects are likely to be small in most
circumstances, however.
5 MMS expectations have been available for other countries for some
time. 
6 The number of survey participants and the dates of the survey have
changed over time. Hakkio and Pearce (1985) report that MMS sur-
veyed about 60 money market participants during the early 1980s.
MMS conducted the surveys on both Tuesdays and Thursdays
before February 8, 1980, and on Tuesdays after that date. 
7 Although the MMS survey expectations exhibit fairly good prop-
erties compared with alternatives, they still surely measure market
expectations with some error, both because they are at least a couple
days old and because they reflect the views of a small group of
money managers. More subtly, any macroeconomic release will
surely contain some error about the true state of the economy
because it is estimated with finite resources and limited informa-
tion. Therefore researchers will estimate macroeconomic surprises
with error and this error will generally attenuate the estimated
market response toward zero in regressions where the surprise is
the independent variable. Rigobon and Sack (2008) discuss two
methods to compensate for this error. Bartolini, Goldberg, and
Sacarny (2008) discuss the application of this methodology. 
8 Market analysts sometimes assume that a central bank, such as
the Federal Reserve, has special knowledge of economic conditions
that the public does not share. Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004),
however, show that the unexpected component of the Fed’s policy
actions does not generally improve private sector forecasts of eco-
nomic variables, except for industrial production—which the
Federal Reserve produces. Neely and Dey




Name of announcement announcement Frequency Release lag Source Release time    
Average Hourly Earnings $ per hour Monthly Almost none BLS 8:30 AM                                  
 
Beige Book 8 times per year FRB 2:15 PM              
Business Inventories % m-m Monthly ~6 weeks CB 10:00 AM                  
Capacity Utilization Rate Index (2002 = 100),  Monthly  ~2 weeks FRB 9:15 AM                    
% m-m
Construction Spending % m-m Monthly  ~5 weeks CB 10:00 AM                      
Consumer Confidence Index Index (1985 = 100) Monthly None Conf. Board 10:00 AM                    
Consumer Credit Report % m-m Monthly ~5 weeks FRB 3:00 PM                            
Consumer Installment Credit % m-m, % q-q,  Monthly ~5 weeks FRB 3:00 PM                                      
$ Billions  
Consumer Price Index (CPI) % m-m (1982 = 100) Monthly ~2 weeks BLS 8:30 AM                                      
               
Current Account $ Billions Quarterly ~10 months BEA 8:30 AM                      
Domestic Vehicle Sales Millions of vehicles Monthly Almost none BEA 3:00 PM                    
Durable Goods Orders % m-m Monthly ~3-4 weeks CB 8:30 AM                                            
       
Employment Cost Index % q-q (2005 = 100) Quarterly ~2-3 weeks BLS 8:30 AM          
Existing Home Sales No. of sales  Monthly ~4 weeks NAR 10:00 AM                        
Factory Inventories Change in $ billions Monthly  ~4 weeks CB 10:00 AM                    
Factory Orders Change in $ billions Monthly  ~4 weeks CB 10:00 AM                          
Federal Budget/Deficit $ Trillions Monthly CBO 2:00 PM                              
FOMC Minutes 8 times per year ~2-3 weeks FRB 2:00 PM                                      
                                   
GDP-Advance % q/q Quarterly 1-month lag BEA 8:30 AM                            
GDP-Deflator % q/q  Quarterly BEA 8:30 AM                                    
GDP-Final % q/q Quarterly  3-month lag BEA 8:30 AM                                  
GDP-Preliminary % q/q  Quarterly  2-month lag BEA 8:30 AM                              
Housing Starts No. of units, % m-m Monthly ~3 weeks CB 8:30 AM                        
Humphrey-Hawkins Testimony Semiannual FRB Chairman 10:00 AM                      
Index of Coincident Indicators m-m Monthly ~3 weeks Conf. Board 10:00 AM              
Industrial Production Index (2002 = 100),  Monthly ~2 weeks FRB 9:15 AM      
% m-m
Initial Unemployment Claims  No. of claims Weekly ~5 days ETA 8:30 AM                
NOTE: CPI, consumer price index; GDP, gross domestic product; NAPM, National Association of Purchasing Managers; NFP, nonfarm 
payroll; PCE, personal consumption expenditures; PMI, Purchasing Managers’ Index; PPI, producer price index. The following abbrevia-
tions are used for announcement sources: BEA, Bureau of Economic Analysis; BLS, Bureau of Labor Statistics; CB, U.S. Census Bureau; 
Conf. Board, Conference Board; CBO, Congressional Budget Office; Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce; ETA, Department of 
Labor’s Employment and Training Administration; FRB, Federal Reserve Board; ISM, Institute for Supply Management; NAR, National 
Association of Realtors; Treasury, U.S. Department of the Treasury. m-m, Level change from month to month; % m-m, percent change 
from month to month; % q/q, percent change quarter over quarter; % q-q, percent change from quarter to quarter. All times are 
eastern standard.Neely and Dey
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        Description of announcement
            Average hourly wage of production and nonsupervisory workers on private nonfarm payrolls by industry sector and selected 
industry detail.
          Overviews of the economy by Federal Reserve district.
        Value of unsold goods held by manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers.
                  Percentage of available resources being utilized by factories, mines, and utilities.
 
          Total amount spent by builders on public, residential, and non-residential construction projects.
              Mood of consumers with respect to present and future economic conditions.
          Consumer credit outstanding; categorized as auto, revolving, and other and disaggregated by major holders. 
                Total value of outstanding consumer installment debt, such as credit cards, education, and auto loans. Excludes debt secured by 
  real estate.
                  The normalized price paid by urban consumers for a representative basket of goods and services using a fixed-weight index. 
The core CPI excludes prices of food and energy.
        Balance of trade + net factor payments + net transfer payments. 
            Annualized number of domestically produced vehicles sold in the previous month.
          Value of new purchase orders placed with domestic manufacturers for goods with a life expectancy of more than 3 years, such as 
automobiles, computers, appliances, and airplanes.
                Total compensation for civilian workers. 
              Annualized number of existing residential buildings that were sold during the previous month.
              Value of inventories of domestic manufacturers for durable and nondurable goods.
              Value of new purchase orders placed with domestic manufacturers for durable and nondurable goods.
      A review of the state of the economy and budget, and related forecasts on future outlook.
            A detailed record of the Committee’s interest rate meeting held about two weeks earlier. The minutes provide detailed insights 
regarding the FOMC’s stance on monetary policy, so traders carefully comb them for clues regarding future interest rate shifts.
      Initial estimate of GDP, total value of all goods and services produced by the economy.
      Annualized quarterly implied rate of inflation for all economic activity. Used to calculated difference between nominal and real GDP.
        Final estimate of GDP, total value of all goods and services produced by the economy, revising the preliminary.
          Revision to estimate of advance-GDP, total value of all goods and services produced by the economy.
              Annualized number of new residential buildings that began construction during the previous month.
      Report on monetary policy and U.S. economic performance from the Federal Reserve.
            Measure of aggregate economic activity from several series.
              Output of industrial firms.
 
              Number of first-time filings of jobless claims, seasonally adjusted.
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Name of announcement announcement Frequency Release lag Source Release time    
International Trade in Goods  $ Billions  Monthly ~6 weeks Commerce 8:30 AM                
and Services
Inventories and Sales Ratio Monthly ~6 weeks CB 10:00 AM  
ISM Index  Index Monthly Almost none ISM 10:00 AM                                  
(formerly the NAPM Survey)                  
Lagging Indicators m-m Monthly ~3 weeks Conf. Board 10:00 AM                
Leading Indicators m-m Monthly ~3 weeks Conf. Board 10:00 AM                    
M1  Change in $ billions Weekly FRB 4:30 PM                                    
M2 Change in $ billions Weekly FRB 4:30 PM                                      
                 
Merchandise Trade Balance $ Billions Monthly ~6 weeks CB 8:30 AM                  
New Home Sales Thousands Monthly  ~3-4 weeks CB 10:00 AM                        
Nonfarm Payrolls  Thousands Monthly A few days BLS 8:30 AM                                      
         
Personal Consumption Expenditure   % m-m Monthly ~4 weeks BEA 8:30 AM                                          
Index (PCE)
Personal Income % m-m Monthly ~4 weeks BEA 8:30 AM      
Personal Spending % m-m Monthly ~4 weeks BEA 8:30 AM              
Producer Price Index % m-m, Index (1982 = 100) Monthly ~2 weeks BLS 8:30 AM              
Productivity Costs Index of output/  Quarterly Several months BLS 8:30 AM                                        
index of hours worked                                  
                     
Retail Sales (Advance) % m-m Monthly ~2 weeks CB 8:30 AM                                          
Retail Trade $ Millions Monthly ~6 weeks CB 8:45 (Sales) and                           
10:15 (Inventories)        
Target Federal Funds Rate % 8 times a year FRB 2:15 PM                    
Trade Balance $ Billions Monthly  ~6-7 weeks BEA 8:30 AM              
Treasury Auction Results Weekly Treasury 11:00 AM                    
Unemployment rate % of labor force Monthly A few days BLS 8:30 AM                              
U.S. Exports % m-m (2000 = 100) Monthly ~5-6 weeks CB 8:30 AM                    
U.S. Imports % m-m (2000 = 100) Monthly ~5-6 weeks CB 8:30 AM                  
Value of New Construction  $ Millions, % m-m Monthly  ~5 weeks CB 10:00 AM                          
Put in Place
NOTE: CPI, consumer price index; GDP, gross domestic product; NAPM, National Association of Purchasing Managers; NFP, nonfarm 
payroll; PCE, personal consumption expenditures; PMI, Purchasing Managers’ Index; PPI, producer price index. The following abbrevia-
tions are used for announcement sources: BEA, Bureau of Economic Analysis; BLS, Bureau of Labor Statistics; CB, U.S. Census Bureau; 
Conf. Board, Conference Board; CBO, Congressional Budget Office; Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce; ETA, Department of 
Labor’s Employment and Training Administration; FRB, Federal Reserve Board; ISM, Institute for Supply Management; NAR, National 
Association of Realtors; Treasury, U.S. Department of the Treasury. m-m, Level change from month to month; % m-m, percent change 
from month to month; % q/q, percent change quarter over quarter; % q-q, percent change from quarter to quarter. All times are 
eastern standard.Neely and Dey
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2010 423
   
   
   
        Description of announcement
                Total exports of goods and services minus total imports.
 
          Inventories/sales ratio.
        A national manufacturing index based on a survey of purchasing executives at roughly 300 industrial companies. Signals expansion
      when the PMI is above 50 and contraction when below.
        Lagging measure of aggregate economic activity from several series.
        Combining 10 series to measure likely change in economic activity. 
          A relatively narrow measure of the money supply (M1). The most-liquid forms of money, namely currency and checkable deposits.
        A less-liquid measure of money than M1. The non-M1 components of M2 are primarily household holdings of savings deposits, 
small time deposits, and retail money market mutual funds. 
          The net difference between imports and exports in an economy.
          Annualized number of new residential buildings that were sold during the previous month.
          Nonfarm payrolls: change in number of employed people during the previous month, excluding the farming industry, as well as 
trends in hiring payments and sectors.
             Price level of consumers when purchasing goods and services, a Fisher index. The core PCE excludes prices of food and energy. 
 
        Income received by individuals.
        Amount spent by consumers on goods and services.
                  Price level of output from domestic producers. 
            Output, measured net of price change and interindustry transactions, is compared with labor input, measured as hours at work in 
      the sector for the major U.S. economic sectors, including the business sector, the nonfarm business sector, nonfinancial corpora-
tions, and manufacturing, along with subsectors of durable and nondurable goods manufacturing.
          An advance estimate of the value of sales at the retail level, based on a sample of both small and large firms.
            Comprises establishments engaged in retailing merchandise, generally without transformation, and rendering services incidental 
  to the sale of merchandise.
              FOMC sets the target interest rate at each of its meetings.
          Value of exported less imported goods and services.
      The type and value of Treasury securities to be auctioned. 
              Unemployed workers—those seeking work but never employed during the period—as a percentage of the labor force.
              Exports disaggregated by country of final destination and type of good.
              Imports disaggregated by country of origin and type of good.
                    This is part of the total construction spending report released by the Census Bureau.
   
                                 
                             
                                       
                               
                               
                                       
                                           
 times per year and since February 1994 has issued
a statement about the state of the economy and
its federal funds rate decision upon the conclu-
sion of the meetings. Since 1995, these statements
have been issued at about 2:15 PM, except for
March 1996, when the statement was released at
11:39 AM to avoid a conflict with the Chairman’s
congressional testimony.9 Before 1994, the FOMC
did not explicitly announce its target rate but
signaled it through open market transactions.
FOMC decisions affect the value of the dollar;
unexpectedly higher interest rates are thought to
raise the value of the dollar by increasing the
quantity demanded of U.S. debt instruments.
Several important news releases pertain to
real economic activity in the labor, housing,
consumption, and production markets. Because
the Federal Reserve usually raises short-term
interest rates in response to unexpectedly strong
real activity, such a positive shock usually raises
expected future U.S. interest rates relative to for-
eign interest rates and therefore strengthens the
dollar immediately.10
Although it is not the first employment report
released, market participants view the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) Employment Situations
report, which includes nonfarm payrolls, as the
most influential employment release. The
Department of Labor releases a timelier but less
watched—per conventional wisdom in the finan-
cial press—weekly report on initial unemployment
claims on Thursdays at 8:30 AM eastern time.
Market participants likewise closely watch
housing news because of the cyclical sensitivity
of the housing market. The Census Bureau releases
monthly Housing Starts—the number of new
houses started, expressed at an annual rate—about
two or three weeks into the month that follows
the announncement; New Home Sales (single-
family) about 30 days after the end of the month;
and Construction Spending on the final day of
the second month that follows the activity to
which the announcement pertains. Finally, the
National Association of Realtors releases the
monthly Existing Homes Sales report about five
weeks after the end of the month. The Existing
Home Sales report has limited predictive power,
however, because its information is dated; sales
of existing homes are counted only at the end of
the home-buying process. In contrast, Housing
Starts is timelier because it records the start of
new home construction.
Gross domestic product (GDP) is the most
comprehensive measure of real economic activity
and, as such, is important to financial markets.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) releases
quarterly advanced GDP reports in the final week
of January, April, July, and October, with two revi-
sion rounds—preliminary and final—following
one and two months later, respectively.
Several releases pertain to consumer behavior:
monthly retail sales, monthly personal income,
monthly personal spending, and monthly con-
sumer confidence. Retail sales (of goods) is the
first monthly announcement on consumer spend-
ing—the Census Bureau releases it about two
weeks into the following month—and it often
contains a large surprise component. Both the
Conference Board and the University of Michigan
release survey data on consumer confidence.
Each month the Conference Board surveys 5,000
households about labor market conditions, typi-
cally receiving 3,500 responses. It summarizes
the results in a Consumer Confidence survey on
the last Tuesday of the month. The University of
Michigan surveys 500 people about their financial
situation and their views of the U.S. economy and
then releases a study on Consumer Sentiment on
the second Friday of each month, with final revi-
sions released on the last Friday of the month.
The Michigan study has a broader perspective
than the Conference Board survey, which concen-
trates on labor market conditions.
At least three monthly announcements focus
on production: the Institute for Supply Manage  -
ment (ISM) Manufacturing Survey, the Durable
9 The federal funds rate is an overnight interbank interest rate. The
Open Market Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York buys
and (rarely) sells Treasury bills to control the federal funds rate,
which strongly influences other short-term interest rates. Mizrach
and Neely (2009) detail Federal Reserve procedures and institu-
tional details regarding trading in U.S. Treasuries. Fleming and
Piazzesi (2005) nicely document the recent history of FOMC policy
announcement times and market reactions. 
10 Faust et al. (2007) and Evans (2010) each detail their own preferred
views of the relation of exchange rates to fundamentals and how
macro announcements could affect exchange rates through interest
rates and risk premia.
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report. The ISM Manufacturing Survey—formerly
the NAPM survey—is very timely, released on
the first business day of the following month. Its
new export orders series is most directly relevant
to currency markets. The Federal Reserve Board
simultaneously releases the monthly Industrial
Production and Capacity Utilization reports about
two weeks following the business month. The
Census Bureau’s Durable Goods Orders report is
less timely, coming three or four weeks into the
following month, but is still influential: It describes
orders for cyclically sensitive items that last more
than 3 years, such as capital goods, computers,
and steel. The Factory Orders report, released
weeks later by the Census Bureau, includes non-
durable goods but lacks additional forecasting
value. The Census Bureau also publishes the
Business Inventories Report—formerly the Manu  -
facturing and Trade Inventories and Sales Report—
six weeks after the relevant month. Currency
traders usually interpret a rising inventories-to-
sales ratio as indicative of a weaker economy,
lower interest rates, and a weaker dollar.
The BLS releases three monthly inflation
announcements around the middle of the follow-
ing month: Import and Export Prices, the Producer
Price Index (PPI), and the Consumer Price Index
(CPI). The PPI measures the price inflation of
initial (crude), intermediate, and final goods,
and presages the CPI release.11 Although one
might think that unexpectedly high inflation
would reduce the value of the dollar through
purchasing power parity (PPP), the effect depends
on the expected Federal Reserve reaction to infla-
tion pressures. If inflation pressures create expec-
tations of higher interest rates, then the dollar
could appreciate. 
The Census Bureau releases the highly rele-
vant but untimely monthly trade balance report
1½ months after the trading month. Similarly,
the BEA releases the quarterly current account
balance—with a Merchandise Trade Balance
section, matching the Census Bureau release—
2½ months after the end of the quarter. These
announcements are formally called the Interna  -
tional Trade in Goods and Services and the Inter  -
na  tional Transactions Account (Current Account),
respectively.12 A positive (negative) trade balance
surprise implies a smaller (larger) U.S. trade deficit
and generally dollar appreciation (depreciation). 
The Conference Board publishes indices for
the Leading Economic Indicators, Coincident
Indicators, and Lagging Indicators about three
weeks after the reviewed month. These indicators
do not generally influence the foreign exchange
market because the components are essentially




This section describes the literature that stud-
ies the effect of announcements on conditional
mean exchange rate returns. The appendix
shows summary information—an abbreviated
abstract, the type of exchange rate, sample period,
announcements, etc.—for these papers. 
Methodology
To compare coefficients on announcement
surprise series with different magnitudes, recent
researchers have typically followed Balduzzi,
Elton, and Green (2001) in standardizing surprises
by subtracting the MMS expectation from the
release and dividing those differences by the stan-
dard deviation of the series of differences. For
example, the standardized surprise for announce-
ment j is as follows:
Neely and Dey
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11 Initial goods include raw materials such as oil, coal, and wheat.
Intermediate goods encompass papers, fabrics, cogs, and any other
materials in the process of becoming a final good. Final goods are
those goods used directly by consumers and businesses, rather
than inputs to production. 
12 The current account also includes international factor payments—
e.g., dividend or coupon payments—from past asset purchases. In
addition, there are technical differences in how these statistics are
constructed. The BEA uses quarterly chaining on annualized data,
as well as underlying NIPA current dollar data. The Census uses
monthly chaining with monthly data and Census current dollar
data.(1)     
where Rt
j is the realization of announcement j at
day t, Et
j is the MMS market expectation, and ˃ ˆj
is the estimated standard deviation of the series of
the differences. Thus, researchers use announce-
ment surprises that are close to mean zero and
have a unit standard deviation.
Because causality runs one way—exchange
rates should react rapidly to the surprise compo-
nent of announcements—the determination of
the effect of announcement surprises on exchange
rate returns is simple in a traditional “event study.”
Specifically, the most common method to study
the effect of announcements on exchange rate
returns is to simply regress exchange rate returns
on J announcement surprises—perhaps with leads
and lags of the surprises to characterize informa-
tion leakage or delays in response—and other
variables (Xt), such as interest rates, that may
affect exchange rate returns:
(2)      .
Researchers interpret the coefficient, ʱj, as the
change in the return as a result of a one-standard-
deviation surprise in the jth type of news.13
Efficient Markets and the Earliest
Announcement Studies
Researchers began assessing the role of
macroeconomic news on foreign exchange rates
in the early 1980s. Fama’s (1970) EMH and the
uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) hypothesis
motivated the methods of these early papers.
Specifically, efficient markets implied that “news”
should explain any deviations of exchange rates
from UIP. Several similar papers—Dornbusch
(1980), Frenkel (1981), and Edwards (1982a,b)—
explored this issue. Generally, they regressed
monthly interest rate–adjusted foreign exchange
returns—i.e., deviations from UIP—on “news”
about various macro fundamentals related to
monetary conditions, output, trade balances, and
R S t j j
J
t












such. Edwards (1982a), for example, applied
Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated regressions
(SUR) to a system of UIP equations augmented
with the difference between U.S. and foreign news
about money supplies, income, interest rates, and
monthly returns from July 1973 to September
1979. The author found mixed evidence that
these news differentials predict deviations from
UIP. Finding the “news” that moves exchange
rates would require further investigation.
Unfortunately, the monthly data used in
these early studies hindered precise estimates of
announcement effects because noise from unre-
lated effects or other announcements would
obscure true relations in the data (Hakkio and
Pearce, 1985). In the 1980s the increasing avail-
ability of high-frequency data and more powerful
computers allowed researchers to investigate
foreign exchange reactions to macroeconomic
announcements with much greater precision.
High-frequency data produce inherently more
precise estimates because they enable the econo-
metrician to analyze price movements in a short
interval around the announcement, which isolates
the announcement’s effect on the exchange rate.
Early Studies of the Effect of U.S.
Monetary Policy on Foreign Exchange
Returns
Early announcement studies focused on
money supply releases because money was key
to the exchange rate models of the 1970s and the
Federal Reserve targeted nonborrowed reserves
to achieve a desired path for M1 from October
1979 to October 1982. Several papers studied the
impact of U.S. monetary news on foreign exchange
markets, including the stability of such reactions
in the presence of changes in Federal Reserve
operating procedure. 
A puzzling positive correlation between
weekly money supply (M1) shocks and interest
rate changes motivated some of this research.
The correlation was puzzling because it seemed
counter to the presumption that a liquidity effect
should produce a negative correlation between
money supply shocks and interest rates. Two pos-
sible explanations for the negative correlation
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13 We will see later that microstructure researchers would prefer a
more complex system that includes order flow. were (i) positive money supply shocks increased
interest rates through a Fisher effect or (ii) positive
money supply shocks raised interest rates by
creating expectations that the Federal Reserve
would reverse those positive shocks in the future
by raising interest rates.14 These explanations
could alternatively be interpreted as a market
expectation of a persistent money supply shock
or a market expectation that the Fed would counter
a money demand shock with higher rates.
Two very similar, approximately contempo-
raneous studies—Cornell (1982) and Engel and
Frankel (1984)—attempted to resolve this puzzle
with evidence from the foreign exchange market.15
These studies regressed daily exchange rate
changes on money supply announcement sur-
prises, determining that positive M1 shocks
increased the value of the USD. Cornell (1982)
and Engel and Frankel (1984) argue that these
results support the notion that a rising money
supply produces expectations of future monetary
tightening. The latter authors described this notion
as “Keynesian,” but it is not clear why it should
be specifically associated with Keynesian think-
ing.16 Cornell (1983) added evidence from stock
and long-term interest rate markets, considered
more explanations for the puzzle, and concluded
that the data were not fully consistent with any
one model. 
Later papers considered two questions: How
do reactions vary in response to policy changes?
How do exchange rates react to a broader set of
macroeconomic surprises?
Hardouvelis (1984) studied the October 1979
shift in Fed operating procedures from interest
rate targeting to control of the money supply.
Using Friday-to-Monday spot exchange rates
from February 15, 1980, to June 25, 1982, and
UIP to measure expected future exchange rates,
Hardouvelis (1984) found that positive M1 sur-
prises appreciate the spot value of the dollar but
reduce its expected future value.17 He concluded
that the liquidity effect dominates in the short
run—markets expect higher real rates in response
to M1 growth—but that the inflation premium
(the Fisher effect) reduces the expected future
value of the dollar.18 In contrast, positive M1
shocks tended to depreciate the dollar in 1977-79.
Although the Fed did not have complete inflation-
fighting credibility in either sample, results from
the foreign exchange market indicate that its credi-
bility was much higher in the second subsample,
after October 1979.
Hardouvelis (1988) followed up on his earlier
study by examining how the importance of mon-
etary and macro announcements changed in
response to the end of Federal Reserve monetary
targeting in October 1982. Using daily data from
October 11, 1979, through August 16, 1984, he
showed that markets responded significantly to
trade deficit, inflation, and business cycle news.
But exchange rate reactions to news about reserves
displayed some instability. Sheehan and Wohar
(1995) found that U.S. money supply announce-
ments stopped affecting USD rates in 1986 or 1987.
This date is consistent with Meulendyke’s (1998)
estimate of when the FOMC switched to interest
rate targeting but later than Thornton’s (2006)
assessment of 1982. Sheehan and Wohar (1995)
also found some evidence of asymmetry: Only
bad news affects exchange rates.
Hakkio and Pearce (1985) researched the effect
of M1, CPI, PPI, unemployment, and industrial
production shocks on seven exchange rates with
three exchange rate observations per day over
three subsamples that were defined by perceived
changes in Federal Reserve operating procedures:
(i) federal funds targeting, September 29, 1977, to
October 5, 1979; (ii) reserves targeting, October 6,
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14 This line of research helped to illuminate the distinction between
uncertainty about the long-run inflation rate and short-run liquid-
ity. This distinction is featured in recent New Keynesian models
such as Smets and Wouters (2007), Ireland (2007), and Cogley and
Sbordone (2008).
15 Engel and Frankel (1984) was written in 1982. 
16 Engel and Frankel (1984) associated the idea that tighter money
market conditions would raise interest rates with Keynesian
IS/LM modeling. 
17 With the benefit of hindsight, the persistent failure of the UIP
relation to predict exchange rates makes it seem inappropriate to
equate interest-adjusted exchange rates (i.e., forward or future rates)
with “expected spot rates.” In the early 1980s, such evidence was
just beginning to emerge, however. 
18 Culbertson and Koray (1986) investigate the correlation between
money growth and interest rates through regressions of the forward
premium on money shocks, but this does not shed light directly
on foreign exchange responses to money supply changes. 1979, to October 4, 1982; and (iii) federal funds
targeting, October 6, 1982, to March 2, 1984. Only
unexpected changes in M1 consistently affected
exchange rates, the changes in exchange rates
occurred rapidly, and those effects were signifi-
cant only after October 1979, confirming the
results of Hardouvelis (1984). After October 1979,
the foreign exchange market began to behave as
though it believed that the Federal Reserve would
reverse positive M1 shocks by raising interest
rates.
Tandon and Urich (1987) evaluate the effects
of both U.S. money supply and PPI and CPI
inflation announcements on interest rates and
exchange rates for seven industrialized countries
from 1977 to 1982. Regrettably, they did not allow
for structural breaks during the sample to reflect
the October 1979 changes in Federal Reserve
operating procedures, as they did for some of
their work on interest rates. Nevertheless, the
authors found that the value of the USD signifi-
cantly appreciated with respect to the GBP and
CAD in response to a positive PPI shock, possibly
because markets expected the Federal Reserve
to reverse such a price level shock with higher
interest rates in the future.19 CPI announcements,
which are released later than PPI, had no effect
on exchange rates or interest rates. It is not clear
why Tandon and Urich (1987) found significant
effects for PPI shocks on the GBP and CAD when
Hakkio and Pearce (1985) had not, but Hakkio
and Pearce’s (1985) relatively short subsamples
might have contributed by reducing the power of
their tests. On the other hand, Hakkio and Pearce’s
(1985) three observations per day should have pro-
vided better power to reject the null of no effect.
One should note that it is not necessary for
the FOMC to respond directly to PPI shocks for
such shocks to influence expectations of future
policy. Shocks can move exchange rates if the
market thinks that either the FOMC does pay
attention to the shock or the FOMC (or another
central bank) pays attention to something that
PPI predicts, such as shocks to the CPI or shocks
to PCE. It is also possible that the results were
simply spurious.
Early Studies of Non-U.S. Monetary
Policy and Foreign Exchange Returns
Several papers studied exchange rate reac-
tions to non-U.S. money supply/monetary policy
announcements. A common theme was that mar-
ket reactions to money supply or macroeconomic
announcements depended on market expectations
of the central bank’s response to the surprise. 
Doukas (1985), for example, used daily data
to compare the reactions of the CAD/USD
exchange rate to U.S. and Canadian money sup-
ply announcements from 1974 to 1978. Using an
ARIMA model to compute expectations, he found
that U.S. money surprises were more influential
on foreign exchange markets than were their
Canadian counterparts, speculating that this was
because the weekly U.S. figures were released
50 minutes before the analogous Canadian num-
bers.20 Alternatively, Canadian monetary policy
announcements might have been perceived as
less important because markets believed that
the Bank of Canada was following the Federal
Reserve’s policy actions to maintain stable
exchange rates.
Ito and Roley (1987) investigated whether
tight monetary policy or the underlying strength
of the U.S. economy was responsible for the strong
appreciation of the USD in the early 1980s. Using
five observations per day over several subsam-
ples of 1980-85, Ito and Roley (1987) examined
responses to U.S. and Japanese money, industrial
production, and price announcements. Positive
shocks to the U.S. money supply had the largest
positive effect on the value of the dollar, which
probably reflected expectations that the positive
shocks would be reversed in the future with higher
interest rates. This effect confirms findings by
Hardouvelis (1984) and Hakkio and Pearce (1985).
20 Gilbert et al. (2010) investigate the importance of three factors—
ability to forecast FOMC decisions and current GDP, timeliness,
and revision noise—in explaining the differential impact of news
on interest rates, equities, and exchange rates. They find that time-
liness is the single most important factor, followed by ability to
forecast FOMC decisions and current GDP. 
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19 Clarida and Waldman (2008) show that the domestic currency
can appreciate in response to a higher-than-expected inflation
shock if the domestic central bank follows a Taylor rule. They also
provide some empirical evidence on the effect of inflation shocks
on the exchange rates of 10 countries over the 2001-05 period. Very similarly, MacDonald and Torrance (1988)
used exchange rate reactions to U.K. money supply
announcements to determine that a higher-than-
anticipated money supply induced expectations
of future reversals of the money supply, higher
interest rates, and exchange rate appreciation
rather than the depreciation that would be induced
by expectations of higher inflation.
Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998) used
two years of 5-minute DEM/USD data to determine
the effects of U.S. and German macroeconomic
news. Markets reacted less strongly and more
slowly to German announcements than U.S.
announcements, perhaps because—according to
Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998)—the former
were unscheduled during 1992-94. Of course,
another explanation for the weaker reaction is
that the reaction occurred gradually as informa-
tion leaked prior to the official announcement.
While other papers have presented evidence of
information leakage prior to German announce-
ments, Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998) argue
that this explanation is unlikely: There was no
evidence of systematic reaction to the announce-
ment surprise in the minutes prior to the release.21
As with many other papers in the literature on
monetary policy news and exchange rates, the
authors concluded that expectations of the respec-
tive central bank’s reaction function determine
market reaction to announcements. 
Budget Deficits and Foreign Exchange
Returns
Deravi et al. (1989) define three subsamples—
similar to those defined by Hakkio and Pearce
(1985) according to Federal Reserve operating
procedures—in finding that neither anticipated
nor unanticipated U.S. Treasury debt announce-
ments (1975:Q3–1985:Q3) affect foreign exchange
returns. The authors suggest that some combina-
tion of Federal Reserve interest rate–targeting
policies, an incorrect expectations specification
from ARIMA models, or a lack of power could
explain their negative results. Indeed, the short
length of their subsamples (3 to 4 years) with
quarterly announcements suggests that the tests
probably had very little power to reject the null
hypothesis that debt announcement shocks did
not influence foreign exchange markets.
Later work by Beck (1993) and Kitchen (1996)
on debt announcements suggests the sample might
have been part of the problem. Using data from
January 1980 through July 1990, Beck (1993) con-
sidered whether M1 shocks, U.S. federal budget
balance shocks, and spending projections influ-
enced exchange rates. Beck’s results emphasized
the importance of international capital flows:
Unexpectedly large budget deficit surprises raised
real U.S. rates, which caused capital inflows
and USD appreciation.22 Government deficits did
not crowd out real investment so much as they
imported investment from abroad. As with the
findings for money supplies, Beck (1993) found
some evidence that market perceptions of policy
changed the impact of deficit shocks. That is,
foreign exchange markets seemed to stop react-
ing to deficit shocks after the passage of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill in 1985, which
was widely perceived to limit future deficits. In
short, exchange rates react to budget deficit news
when that news is viewed as indicating persistent,
unsustainable deficits.
Early Work on the Trade Balance and
Employment Effects
Just as monetary policy issues strongly influ-
enced research in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
the emergence of very high unemployment rates
in the early 1980s and record U.S. trade deficits
in the mid- to late 1980s prompted a surge in
research on the effects of those announcements
on foreign exchange markets. During the late
1980s, anecdotal reports indicated that the large
U.S. trade deficit heavily influenced currency
markets: Geiger (1989) notes that “the dollar fin-
ished stronger yesterday, lifted by the report of
the smallest monthly U.S. trade deficit since
December 1984.” 
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21 Andersson, Hansen, and Sebestyén (2009) find evidence that
markets obtain information about German unemployment data
prior to the official announcement.
22 With a somewhat longer sample, 1981 to 1994, Kitchen (1996)
confirmed Beck’s (1993) results that the larger deficit projections
tend to raise the value of the USD. Interestingly, Kitchen notes that
the degree of international financial integration influences the
strength of the response of foreign financial markets to U.S. news. Traders presumably feared either (i) that U.S.
policymakers would respond to high deficits
with protectionist measures or contractionary
monetary policy or (ii) that natural equilibrating
mechanisms—associated with dollar deprecia-
tion—would tend to reduce deficits.
Even the earliest researchers noticed that
market reactions to trade deficit news varied
through time, as trade deficits became too large
to be sustainable. Deravi et al. (1988) and Irwin
(1989) found evidence that the trade balance had
significant effects, but only after 1985 and June
1984, respectively. Larger U.S. trade surpluses
(deficits) were associated with USD appreciation
(depreciation). Hogan, Melvin, and Roberts (1991)
examine reasons for the increasing sensitivity and
conclude that unexpectedly large trade deficits
create expectations of U.S. foreign exchange inter-
vention and/or protectionist trade measures. Klein,
Mizrach, and Murphy (1991) and Aggarwal and
Schirm (1992) both argue that increased policy
cooperation—the 1985 Plaza accords—increased
the influence of balance of trade announcements
on currency returns. Karfakis and Kim (1995) dis-
cover two significant breaks in the effect of U.S.
trade deficit news on the AUD/USD exchange rate
from 1985 to 1992. The breaks occurred in October
1987 and January 1990, which coincided with a
major worldwide stock market crash and a shift
in Australian monetary policy, respectively. It is
not clear why these events would have prompted
a change in currency markets’ reactions to trade
deficits.
Returns might react asymmetrically to trade
deficit news, as they do to other announcements.
For example, if the U.S. trade deficit is viewed as
nearly unsustainable, an unexpected rise in that
statistic could have large effects on the expected
(and thus current) value of the dollar, whereas an
equally sized unexpected decline in that statistic
could lead to almost no change in the dollar’s
value. This possibility motivated study of the
symmetry of response to trade balance releases.
Sultan (1994) finds that positive/negative balance
of trade announcements have asymmetric influ-
ences on exchange rates and that the impact of
that news can differ across spot and futures mar-
kets. No subsequent research confirmed this latter
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pattern.23 Aggarwal and Schirm (1998) find both
asymmetry and nonlinearity in exchange rate
reactions to U.S. trade balance announcements.
Curiously, smaller surprises have a proportion-
ately larger impact on exchange rates. Fatum,
Hutchison, and Wu (2010) studied asymmetric
effects for a wide variety of announcements with
a fairly long sample but found no asymmetry for
U.S. trade balance announcement effects on the
JPY/USD.
In addition to the trade balance and monetary
policy announcements, early researchers such as
Harris and Zabka (1995) and Moorthy (1995)
recognized the importance of the employment
report. Unexpectedly strong employment in the
United States increased the foreign exchange
value of the dollar, perhaps because it increased
expected short-term interest rates. Consistent with
this interpretation, Moorthy (1995) documents
that U.S. employment news that raised the value
of the dollar also raised short-term U.S. interest
rates. Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995) support
the claim that employment news affects foreign
exchange returns through expectations of future
interest rates. 
Curiously, Payne (1996) finds that U.S. trade
balance and employment releases produce large
effects that persist for over an hour. The reason
for the delay is not clear and the finding could be
spurious. The next section describes the event
study results on the speed of market reactions to
announcements.
How Fast Do Markets Adjust? 
As discussed previously, the semi-strong form
of the EMH predicts that any systematic reaction
to public news should be very rapid, to preclude
abnormal profit opportunities. Ederington and
Lee (1993) investigate how the release of macro-
economic news affects absolute 5-minute USD/
DEM returns. Serial correlation tests indicate
that the mean exchange rate adjusts to scheduled
news within one minute. Ederington and Lee
(1994) confirm these results using USD/JPY data.
Ederington and Lee (1995) use tick-by-tick data
23 Puffer (1995) studies the dynamic behavior of successive balance
of trade announcements and their relation to exchange rates. to refine estimates of the speed of adjustment.
The currency market begins to adjust its prices
within 10 seconds of a news release and com-
pletes the change within 40 seconds. The authors
also argue that prices overreact in the first 40
seconds and then retreat over the next couple of
minutes. 
With a sample similar to that of Ederington
and Lee (1993), Tanner (1997) finds that although
DEM/USD markets react rather quickly to trade
balance announcements, the response to U.S. CPI
announcements is insignificant from 9 to 10 AM
but becomes significant for several periods later
in the day. Tanner suggests that market partici-
pants require hours to digest the complexity of
the CPI report. This explanation is difficult to
reconcile with the fact that the delayed systematic
response is to a simple object (i.e., the surprise
component of the CPI). It is also inconsistent with
other studies of the CPI, such as Hakkio and Pearce
(1985), Tandon and Urich (1987), and Faust et al.
(2007), who all found no significant effect of the
CPI. These facts suggest that Tanner’s finding is
most likely spurious. The systematic reactions
of markets to scheduled news are very rapid
when measured with conventional event study
methods.24
Joint Modeling of Mean Returns and
Volatility
Andersen et al. (2003) use high-frequency
(5-minute) data to comprehensively study the
responses of both the conditional mean and the
conditional volatility of DEM/USD, USD/GBP,
JPY/USD, CHF/USD, and USD/EUR exchange
rates to a large set of U.S. and German announce-
ments. The authors reason that the conditional
volatility cannot be modeled without correctly
modeling the conditional mean, although they
do not explore the practical significance of this
methodological care. The authors estimate the
model in two stages: (i) They estimate the model
by ordinary least squares; (ii) then, with the resid-
uals from the first stage, they reestimate the con-
ditional mean by weighted least squares (WLS),
permitting the variance weights to depend on the
intraday calendar, news, and conditional volatil-
ity effects. WLS more efficiently estimates the
announcement surprise coefficients than would
unweighted estimates with heteroskedasticity-
corrected standard errors. 
Andersen et al. (2003) confirm and elaborate
on some previous findings. Exchange rates react
quickly—“jumping” to a new value and then
showing no systematic movement. Also, the first
release among a group of related announcements
tends to be the most influential. U.S. payroll
employment, orders of durable goods, the balance
of trade, initial unemployment claims, the NAPM
index, retail sales, consumer confidence, and
advance GDP significantly affect all exchange
rates studied. In addition to these universal effects,
CPI, PPI, industrial production, leading indicators,
housing starts, construction spending, the federal
funds rate, new homes sales, and preliminary and
final GDP influence the DEM/USD exchange rate.
Among German announcements, only M3 and
industrial production significantly influence
exchange rates; the authors attribute the relative
lack of significance to the unscheduled timing of
German announcements. In addition, Andersen
et al. (2003) note that markets react asymmetrically
to positive/negative announcement surprises,
where bad news moves exchange rates more than
good news. Generally, positive (negative) U.S.
announcement news induces dollar appreciation
(depreciation). 
Andersen et al. (2003) produced a compre-
hensive and careful event study of the effect of
U.S. and German announcements on exchange
rate returns and also documented asymmetry of
responses and found that bad news produced
more dispersion in analysts’ expectations of
events. In their conclusion, they discussed the
importance of future investigations into how
“order flow” actually translates news into price
changes. The next section reviews how the micro  -
structure literature considered this issue.
Order Flows and Announcement News
The microstructure literature studies the way
that order flows—i.e., signed transaction flows—
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24 Evans and Lyons (2005), however, argue that persistent effects
can be found by jointly analyzing order flow and returns data.impound private information into asset prices.25
For example, commercial firms make investments
based partly on the basis of their privately known
cost structures, and asset managers reallocate
holdings based on their preferences and existing
portfolio.26 These trading decisions impound
private information into prices. And private
information can interact with public information
in informing trading decisions. For example,
investment decisions depend not only on private
information but also on the information in macro  -
economic releases, which might change judg-
ments about the state of the economy or asset
(co)variances.
Much of the literature on announcement
effects on the foreign exchange market has implic-
itly assumed that markets react directly to sur-
prises, without specifying the manner in which
markets translate surprises to price changes.
Starting around 2000, however, researchers began
to consider how trading and news interact to influ-
ence exchange rates. Specifically, researchers
asked two types of questions: (i) Does order flow
itself react to news? (ii) Does order flow help
impound news into prices? If so, does news influ-
ence the price impact of trading?
The issue of order flow reaction to news
requires some explanation. In the context of the
stock market, Hasbrouck (1991) reasoned that
news surprises should not directly affect order
flow under rational expectations. News should
cause an immediate price adjustment to a new
equilibrium price but should not cause systematic
orders; otherwise, the price effects from those
predictable orders would themselves be predict  -
able, creating a profit opportunity. While the
Hasbrouck reasoning has strongly influenced the
microstructure literature, Evans (2010) lays out
two microstructure models in which such reason-
ing fails because announcements can affect order
flow through dealers’ risk management practices.
Dealers adjust their quotes to produce predictable
patterns in order flow to better manage their
inventory risk. 
Four papers do study the effects of news on
order flows (or trading flows). Evans and Lyons
(2005) find that coefficients on standardized news
surprises clearly explain order flow in reduced-
form vector autoregressions (VARs). In fact, even
lagged news significantly determines order flow,
implying a prolonged impact of news on order
flow. Rime, Sarno, and Sojli (2010) find a reduced-
form effect on interdealer order flow for the
USD/EUR, USD/GBP, and JPY/USD exchange
rates. Similarly, Gradojevic and Neely (2009) find
clear reduced-form effects on CAD trading flows
from U.S. macroeconomic news. These reduced-
form impacts are potentially consistent with
Hasbrouck’s (1991) claim that news should not
systematically cause order flows if expectations
are rational, however. For example, if order flows
react systematically to exchange rate changes, then
any announcement that changes the exchange
rate will also predict order flow. The results of
Love and Payne (2008) are not consistent with
Hasbrouck’s reasoning, but Evans’ (2010) inven-
tory management models could explain them.
Love and Payne (2008) find both reduced-form
and systematic structural effects of macro releases
on order flow using identified bivariate VARs
with macro surprises as regressors.
More papers have studied the second issue:
How does order flow mediate the impact of news
on exchange rates? Evans and Lyons (2002) pio-
neered the study of this question with actual
order flows. Their paper does not directly study
announcement effects on exchange rates but
rather finds that macro announcements increase
the price impact of order flow using four months of
DEM/USD transactions from May 1 to August 31,
1996.
Evans and Lyons (2005) use all Citibank
USD/EUR customer trades from April 11, 1993,
to June 30, 1999, to reinvestigate the speed with
which currency market returns and order flows
25 Order flow is related to trading volume as the latter is the sum of
absolute order flows. Some previous work, such as Fleming and
Remolona’s (1999) bond market studies, observed that announce-
ment releases actually reduce trading volume in asset markets. 
26 Unfortunately, the nature of order flow data does not reveal the
specific nature of the private information that prompts the order
and researchers have not—to our knowledge—pursued this issue.
It is unlikely that even the banks that collect the order flow data
generally know the nature of the reason for the order. The closest
that one can come to inferring the private information is to obtain
order flow that is classified into various categories such as com-
mercial or financial. 
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effect as the direct effect of macroeconomic news
releases on foreign exchange currency rates, while
the sum of the direct effect and the indirect effect
of order flows comprises the total news effect.28
Evans and Lyons (2005) argue that the total news
effect of a news release on foreign exchange rates
should include not only the immediate price
response but also the response to delayed trades.
Using a reduced-form VAR model to examine the
joint dynamics of returns and order flows, Evans
and Lyons (2005) find substantial effects of macro
surprises on both returns and order flows. In addi-
tion, they claim that announcements produce a
delayed systematic reversal of the initial price
impact, over the course of several days. This con-
trasts with Ederington and Lee (1995), who find
that price movements are completed within 40
seconds of an announcement. Evans and Lyons
(2005) explain the delay by arguing that end users
do not constantly monitor currency markets and
must take time to evaluate price changes and
transact, presumably because they are rationally
inattentive (Sims, 2005). While it is not immedi-
ately clear how to reconcile this systematic
retrenchment from the initial price impact with
an efficient market response, Evans and Lyons
(2005) explain that the persistent effect is small
and would be difficult to detect in returns alone;
but analyzing the joint behavior of returns and
order flows enables one to find the persistent
effect. Evans (2010) discusses how dealer risk
management might contribute to this persistent
response. Evans and Lyons (2005) also argue
that the inclusion of order flow makes the daily
responses of returns to announcements relatively
stable.
Evans and Lyons (2008) consider a broad
measure of macro news—Reuters Money Market
Headline News—rather than a small group of
specific announcements and study how this news
influences exchange rates through order flow
using a four-month sample of daily and intraday
interdealer order flow and DEM/USD exchange
rates from 1996 (see Evans and Lyons, 2002).29
The authors estimate a complex, nonlinear model
of intraday exchange rate returns and inter  -
dealer order flow with the generalized method
of moments. The arrival of news increases trading
intensity and the price impact of order flow, which
indicates that news disperses private information
through trading activity. The authors go on to iden-
tify the contemporaneous relationship between
daily exchange rates and order flow with the
heteroskedasticity-dependent methods of Rigobon
and Sack (2004) and estimate a simpler model
on daily data with the generalized method of
moments. Macro news generates about 36 percent
of daily exchange rate variance: The direct impact
creates about 14 percent and the order flow chan-
nel about 22 percent. Evans and Lyons (2008) note
that 36 percent is an unusually large proportion
of variance to attribute to public news, compared
with previous studies, and they argue that the
inclusion of order flow effects produces this more-
credible level. Announcements fail to affect daily
order flow’s explanatory power.
With 10 months of 1-minute data on the
USD/EUR, GBP/EUR, and USD/GBP exchange
rates and Rigobon’s (2003) “Identification Through
Heteroskedasticity” procedure, Love and Payne
(2008) use a structural VAR to show that Reuters’
interdealer D2000-2 order flow partially impounds
U.S., U.K., and euro-area aggregated macro news
into prices.30 Treating standardized and signed
news surprises from different series as a single
news variable, the authors find that order flow
accounts for about one-third of the price adjust-
ment produced by announcements. Despite the
mediating role of order flow, prices adjust very
quickly, within two minutes of the news release.
Love and Payne (2008) also reconfirm the tradi-
tional finding that announcement effects depend
on policy expectations. For example, a rise in
U.S. inflation tends to cause the USD to depreci-
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27 Prior to 1999, the authors used the aggregated order flow of all the
euro-area currencies as USD/EUR order flow. 
28 In the language of structural econometrics, the average effect is a
pseudo-structural effect of news while the total news effect is a
reduced-form effect. 
29 The authors also use alternative measures of macro news, includ-
ing aggregated signed surprises for 28 U.S. and 12 German
announcements.
30 The identification scheme assumes that the exchange rate and
order flow structural errors have zero covariance with each other
and with news and follow GARCH(1,1) processes. ate, consistent with PPP, but a rise in U.K. infla-
tion tends to cause the GBP to appreciate. The
authors conjecture that the latter result is consis-
tent with expectations that the Bank of England—
which is an explicit inflation targeter—will raise
interest rates to bring inflation back down to the
target. Alternatively, Beechey’s (2007) work sug-
gests that U.S. inflation expectations are well
anchored and the Love and Payne findings could
be explained if U.S. inflation shocks have a bigger
effect on risk premia than do U.K. inflation shocks.
Order flow also responds to news—in the
same direction as the exchange rate changes—
with a slight delay. Love and Payne (2008) label
this finding as “entirely novel.” The authors spec-
ulate that news systematically influences order
flow because heterogeneous agents disagree on
the implications of announcements for rates and
such disagreement induces order flow. 
Carlson and Lo (2006) have an unusual
announcement study in that they examine the
reaction of the Reuters D2000-2 electronic order
book on foreign exchange transactions to a single
announcement—an October 9, 1997, surprise
interest rate hike by the Bundesbank, aimed at
heading off inflation pressures. Markets initially
responded to this unscheduled and surprising
news with high trading volume, volatility, and a
fall in the DEM/USD rate.
Savaser (2006) uses proprietary order book data
from the Royal Bank of Scotland over two subpe-
riods during the September 1999 to September
2002 sample to show that investors substantially
increase their use of limit orders—stop-loss and
take-profit orders—prior to news releases and
that accounting for this behavior increases the
econometrician’s ability to explain exchange rate
changes, especially large ones.31 Some of the
exchange rate reaction to scheduled news might be
independent of the release’s information content. 
Rime, Sarno, and Sojli (2010) use one year
of high-frequency USD/EUR, USD/GBP, and
JPY/USD data—February 13, 2004, to February 14,
2005—to investigate the ability of Reuters’ inter-
dealer D2000-2 order flows to predict daily
exchange rates. In doing so, they find that macro
announcements are important determinants of
order flow. Consistent with Love and Payne
(2008), good news for the U.S. (foreign) economy
increases (decreases) order flow for the USD. In a
novel contribution, Rime, Sarno, and Sojli (2010)
find that order flow in the days just prior to the
news announcement reflects recent revisions in
MMS expectations after the day of the survey.
Gradojevic and Neely (2009) investigate the
interaction of CAD/USD trading flows—net bank
trades in the foreign exchange market—exchange
rates, and macro news surprises with a vector
error correction model. Although the authors focus
on forecasting, the paper shows that GDP, housing
starts, PCE, CPI, and the U.S. balance of trade all
affect the CAD/USD exchange rate significantly.
Curiously, exchange rates and trading flows exhibit
a strong pattern in response to macro news sur-
prises. Announcements that increase the value
of the USD also tend to increase foreign financial
demand for USDs and decrease commercial
demand for USDs. Thus, the total impact of news
on trading flows depends on the type of trading
flow. One interpretation of the Gradojevic and
Neely (2009) results is that non-Canadian finan-
cial traders react most strongly to news announce-
ments, their trades drive the exchange rate, and
price-sensitive commercial traders then tend to
buy the currency that became cheaper as a result
of the news release.
The announcement/order flow literature con-
siders how announcements might affect exchange
rates by releasing private information through
order flows. Although private agents generally
have incentives to keep their own information
private, policymakers usually have an incentive
to reveal their information to the public to ensure
smooth functioning of markets. The following
section reviews studies of the release of monetary
policy information. 
Recent Research on Monetary Policy,
Announcements, and Exchange Rates
Several trends and events in the late 1990s
renewed attention on monetary policy announce-
31 A stop-loss (take-profit) order instructs dealers to liquidate an
agent’s position in the event that asset prices move to specified
levels against (in favor of) the agent’s position. For example, a
stop-loss order on a long position would be triggered if the price
fell below a specified level. 
Neely and Dey
434 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEWments. First, the U.K. government gave the Bank
of England operational independence in the con-
duct of monetary policy in 1998. Second, as of
January 1, 1999, the European Central Bank (ECB)
began to conduct a common monetary policy for
the original members of the European Monetary
Union: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain. Third, policymakers and
researchers began to seriously consider the
importance of communication and central banks
responded by increasingly explaining their policy
actions.32 Naturally, researchers began to inves-
tigate the effects of policy expectations, policy
actions, and communications more carefully.
Soon after the ECB began to conduct monetary
policy in 1999, researchers began to study its
effect on foreign exchange markets and its influ-
ence on how these markets react to announce-
ments. Galati and Ho (2003), for example, compare
the influence of U.S. and European macroeconomic
announcements on daily USD/EUR exchange rates
in the first two years of the European Monetary
Union. Using rolling regressions, they find that
the geographic origin of news and its “sign” (i.e.,
whether it is good or bad news) determine the
response of the USD/EUR exchange rate.33 The
authors interpret their result to indicate that mar-
kets became pessimistic about the euro’s prospects
near the end of 1999 and reacted strongly to any
bad news from the euro area.
Cagliesi and Tivegna (2005) study scheduled
and unscheduled U.S. and euro-area announce-
ments—policy statements, market events, market
beliefs, terror-related events—using twice-daily
data. Scheduled news affects U.S. trading more,
whereas unscheduled news dominates in
European trading. After dividing their 1999-2004
sample into three subperiods, the authors find
lagged effects of news on exchange rates, which
lead them to reject the semi-strong form EMH.
Other research has not confirmed this curious
finding.
Conrad and Lamla (forthcoming) study the
separate effects of the ECB’s interest rate decision,
press conference, and question-and-answer ses-
sion on the level and volatility of the EUR/USD
exchange rate. The authors find that the press
conference is most relevant for exchange rate
returns. The EUR appreciates in response to
communications about increasing risks to price
stability, consistent with market beliefs that the
ECB will respond strongly to inflation.34 In con-
trast, communications about the real economy or
monetary aggregates do not generate significant
reactions.
Each month since 1997, the Bank of England’s
Monetary Policy Committee has met to decide
interest rate policy.35 Melvin et al. (2009) study
the effect of these Bank of England announce-
ments on currency markets from 1997 to 2007.
Surprisingly, the noon interest rate announce-
ment does not systematically affect returns but
does raise exchange rate volatility for 60 to 90
minutes and such effects are particularly likely
to be large when the announcement content is
unexpected.
Hayo and Neuenkirch (2008 and 2009) use
daily GARCH-in-mean models to analyze the
effect of U.S. macro announcements and mone-
tary policy communications on Argentinean and
Canadian stock, bond, and foreign exchange
market returns and volatility, respectively. Both
sample periods are from 1998 to 2006. The par-
ticular sample period is useful because it con-
tains important breaks in both Argentinean and
Canadian policy. That is, Argentina operated a
currency board until 2002, tightly linking domes-
tic money markets to those in the United States.
The Bank of Canada introduced “fixed announce-
ment days”—scheduled interest rate announce-
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32 For example, the FOMC began to contemporaneously announce
policy actions in 1994 and adopted this as formal policy in 1995.
Starting in August 1997, each FOMC policy directive has included
the quantitative value of the “intended federal funds rate.” And
since 1999, the FOMC has issued a press release after each meeting
with the value of the “intended federal funds rate” and, in most
cases, an assessment of the balance of risks (Poole, Rasche, and
Thornton, 2002).
33 Edison (1996) mentions asymmetry between responses to good
and bad news.
34 This result supports the arguments of Engel and West (2006) and
Clarida and Waldman (2008).
35 On May 6, 1997, Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown
announced that the U.K. government would grant the Bank of
England operational independence over monetary policy. The
Bank of England Act 1998 formalized this arrangement.ments—in September 2000. Hayo and Neuenkirch
(2008) find that, although U.S. announcements
had a significant impact on Argentine markets,
their influence (unsurprisingly) diminished after
the end of the currency board, which was never
completely credible.36 Hayo and Neuenkirch
(2009) determine that while both U.S. and
Canadian macroeconomic announcements influ-
ence foreign exchange returns, the Canadian inter-
est rate announcements mattered most when
U.S. and Canadian interest rate policies diverged
in 2002-04. This is intuitively sensible: As
Canadian announcements imparted more inde-
pendent information about relative fundamen-
tals, markets would pay more attention to them.
Hayo, Kutan, and Neuenkirch (2008) study
FOMC effects on several financial markets, includ-
ing the USD/EUR market, from 1998 to 2006. They
find that formal communications have a greater
influence than informal communications and
that the importance of FOMC members’ statements
depends on their role on the Committee. The
Chairman and Vice Chairman have the greatest
effect on financial markets, governors’ statements
have greater importance than Reserve Bank presi-
dents, and voting presidents have greater impact
than non-voting presidents. Financial markets
react more to newswire reports than to the actual
speeches.
With the onset of the financial crisis in 2007,
central banks began to consider alternative mon-
etary policy tools, including asset purchases.
Although work on the effects of these new policy
tools has been limited, Neely (2010a) used event
study methods to find that announcements of
the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchases
(LSAP) of agency debt, MBS, and long-term U.S.
Treasuries substantially reduced long-term U.S.
and foreign bond yields as well as the foreign
exchange value of the dollar. The exchange rate
effect was roughly consistent with that implied
by a UIP-PPP–based model. The author argues
that the LSAP’s success in reducing long-term
interest rates and the value of the dollar shows
that central banks are not toothless when short
rates hit the zero bound.
In summary, relatively recent research indi-
cates that the effect of monetary policy commu-
nications on foreign exchange markets depends
on the nature of the communication. That is, who
is the communicator? What sort of news (i.e.,
type and geographic origin) do markets perceive
as influencing the particular central banks? What
are the stated and unstated goals of the central
banks? In other words, news influences exchange
rates to the extent that it changes market expecta-
tions of central bank actions. 
Recent Research on Announcements
and Larger Exchange Rate Issues
Researchers have continued to characterize
the exchange rate reactions to macroeconomic sur-
prises while often attempting to link those reac-
tions to larger questions. Simpson, Ramchander,
and Chaudhry (2005) consider what the effects
of announcements imply for the speed of adjust-
ment to several equilibrium foreign exchange con-
ditions. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) reconnect
the announcement literature with forecasting,
while Faust et al. (2007) study the implications
of the joint movement of exchange rates and
interest rates for expected depreciation and risk
premia. Finally, Andersen et al. (2007), Pearce
and Solakoglu (2007), and Fatum, Hutchison,
and Wu (2010) investigate whether the state of
the business cycle influences the impact of macro
announcements on exchange rate returns.
Simpson, Ramchander, and Chaudhry (2005)
investigate the implications of macro surprises
for several “theories of exchange rate determina-
tion”—PPP, covered interest parity, the interna-
tional Fisher effect, balance of payments, and
portfolio balance effects—that might be better
termed equilibrium conditions. The authors cal-
culate the effect of 23 types of U.S. macroeconomic
surprises on a 10-year sample (January 1, 1990,
to September 7, 2000) of daily spot and forward
returns for five exchange rates: CAD, DEM , JPY,
CHF, and GBP per USD. The authors interpret
36 A lack of complete credibility simply means that there is evidence
that people believe that it is possible—even if very unlikely—that
the currency board could break down. One can usually reject
complete credibility for fixed exchange rate arrangements (Neely,
1994 and 1996).
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such as the trade balance, as affecting the dollar’s
value through balance of payments equilibrium.
As in other studies, positive shocks to U.S. infla-
tion do not reduce the dollar’s value, which is
inconsistent with continuous adjustment to PPP,
but is consistent with stable long-run inflation
expectations. 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) attempt to
combine the literatures on exchange rate fore-
casting and macro surprises. Using daily data
from 1993 to 2003 and a WLS procedure similar
to that of Andersen et al. (2003), Ehrmann and
Fratzscher (2005) estimate the impact of macro
surprises from the United States, Germany, and
the euro area. Echoing the findings of Doukas
(1985) on U.S. and Canadian monetary policy
announcements, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005)
find that U.S. surprises have a larger effect than
euro-area surprises because the U.S. announce-
ments are released earlier in the month; exchange
rates respond more strongly to negative or large
shocks or when market uncertainty—measured
by volatility—is high. These authors then argue
that the in-sample fit of the macro announce-
ments effectively tracks the directional changes
in the exchange rate.
Faust et al. (2007) formalize the point that
the source of the shocks determines the effect of
the macro announcements. The change in asset
prices directly around a macro announcement
should depend on how the release changes the
public’s perception of the economy’s state. In
particular, Faust et al. (2007) describe an example
in which lower-than-expected inflation might
result from either weak demand or high produc-
tivity growth. The former shock should decrease
expected future interest rates, whereas the latter
might increase them. Reminiscent of Cornell’s
(1983) methods, Faust et al. (2007) argue that one
should jointly study the effects of announcements
on multiple asset prices to distinguish which
source of shocks is most likely. Using a 16-year
span (January 1987 through December 2002) of
5-minute exchange rate and interest rate data,
the authors find that 10 U.S. macroeconomic
announcement surprises strongly affect exchange
rate returns. Stronger U.S. real activity or over  -
night higher interest rates appreciate the USD
and raise (reduce) U.S. (foreign) interest rates at
all horizons.
Nyblom (1989) tests of parameter constancy
generally fail to reject the null of constant param-
eters over the sample, but random coefficients
estimation do detect a definite decline in the
trade balance coefficients and some decline in
the nonfarm payroll coefficients for the exchange
rate equations.37 This paper generally rejects
parameter instability, concluding that time varia-
tion “does not seem to have been a first order
issue.” But its sample coincides fairly closely
with the well-known “Great Moderation,” a period
of very low macroeconomic volatility (Blanchard
and Simon, 2001). Therefore one might think that
parameter instability is not a first-order issue
when macroeconomic conditions and policies
are stable. 
Reasoning from a risk-augmented UIP relation,
Faust et al. (2007) argue that if stronger-than-
expected U.S. economic data immediately appre-
ciate the USD, then they must also produce some
combination of expected future USD depreciation
or a lower risk premium (i.e., higher prices) for
foreign assets. The authors conclude that because
existing models of risk cannot explain the neces-
sary declines in the risk premium, expected
depreciation seems to be a more plausible conse-
quence of the announcement-induced exchange
rate changes.
Andersen et al. (2007) also emphasize the
use of multiple assets in investigating larger
issues, including the impact of announcements
conditional on the state of the business cycle and
comovements among asset prices. Using their
previously developed two-step WLS procedure,
Andersen et al. (2007) study the effect of 25 U.S.
macro announcements on USD exchange rate
futures, as well as U.S., British, and German stock
and bond futures, using 5-minute data. They meas-
ure the effects for periods of U.S. expansions,
contractions, and the full sample, from January 2,
1992, through December 31, 2002. As in previous
work, positive real shocks to the U.S. economy
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37 Nyblom (1989) proposes a test that parameters are constant versus
the alternative that they follow a random walk. tend to cause USD appreciation. Although they
focused on stock and bond returns, the authors
also documented cross-country linkages in the
U.S. Treasury bond, the S&P500, and the USD/EUR
futures returns over both U.S. expansions and
contractions, identifying the conditional correla-
tion with Rigobon’s (2003) heteroskedasticity-
based methods. The U.S. announcements cannot
explain all the cross-country linkages.
Two recent papers have considered whether
announcement effects are symmetric and depen  -
dent on the business cycle. Pearce and Solakoglu
(2007) find apparently linear, symmetric, and
rapid effects of 11 types of U.S. shocks on 10
years of high-frequency DEM/USD and JPY/USD
exchange rates but do argue that the effects depend
on the state of the economy. Fatum, Hutchison,
and Wu (2010) investigate the impact of 19 U.S.
and 16 Japanese announcements on 5-minute
JPY/USD returns during Japan’s period of zero
interest rates, breaking down the responses by
the state of the business cycle in the two coun-
tries and permitting asymmetry. They conjecture
that the exchange rate is more likely to respond
asymmetrically to news when the zero bound
restricts Japanese policy reactions. This prelimi-
nary work finds some evidence of asymmetries
but would benefit from more formal tests for
such behavior that account for the multiplicity
of simultaneous tests on similar hypotheses.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This article has surveyed the large literature
examining how exchange rate returns react to
economic announcements. Such announcements
furnish a virtual “controlled experiment,” in
the words of Hardouvelis (1988), that permits
researchers to investigate which announcements
influence foreign exchange markets, how markets
perceive policies, how quickly markets react to
new information, and how this information is
impounded into prices.
The fundamental finding of the literature is
that a number of macro announcements—from
several countries—influence exchange rate returns
in consistent ways. Researchers have consistently
found that interest rates, employment, output,
and—though declining in importance—the trade
balance are among the most important U.S.
announcements to the foreign exchange markets.
German monetary announcements and Japanese
manufacturing, industrial, and spending announce-
ments are also influential. Early researchers used
the response of exchange rates to money supply
shocks to illuminate the relation between money
supplies and interest rates (see Cornell, 1982 and
1983; and Engel and Frankel, 1984). This line of
research highlighted the distinction between
uncertainty about short-term liquidity provisions
and long-run inflation objectives.
UIP implies that announcements that raise
(lower) current domestic or expected future
domestic interest rates relative to foreign interest
rates tend to immediately appreciate (depreciate)
the domestic currency. Thus, market reactions to
shocks vary over time, between countries, and
with the state of the business cycle because the
response depends on how the macro shock causes
participants to revise their views of the current
and future state of the economy. As a central bank
gains inflation-fighting credibility, for example,
markets will assume that it will reverse a positive
inflation shock with higher interest rates and
thus positive inflation shocks will appreciate the
domestic currency.
Researchers have exploited this variation
over time and between countries to discern mar-
ket perceptions of policy reactions. Hardouvelis
(1984) and Hakkio and Pearce (1985) used foreign
exchange reactions to macro announcements to
document the Federal Reserve’s growing inflation-
fighting credibility after October 1979. Other
researchers investigated how markets reacted to
similar announcements across countries. For
example, Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998)
argue that differences in the likely responses of
the respective monetary authorities drive differ-
ences in reactions to U.S. and German announce-
ments. Kim (1998) finds that Australian macro
releases produce qualitatively similar impacts
on the AUD as U.S. macro releases do on the USD.
Foreign exchange responses to macro news
can also depend on the shocks or the state of the
business cycle. For example, Andersen et al.
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both consider asymmetry based on the sign of
shocks and the latter paper extends the analysis
to the relative state of the business cycle between
countries. Similarly, Faust et al. (2007) argue
that the source of an inflation shock—demand
or productivity—matters for how markets will
interpret its effect.
Because announcement effects in foreign
exchange markets are not structural—they depend
on market expectations of policy and other fac-
tors—they can be unstable; but researchers disagree
on how prevalent or important such variability is.
Bartolini, Goldberg, and Sacarny (2008) empha-
size that only a few types of announcements have
consistently large and stable effects on asset prices
over time. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2009) and
Sarno and Valente (2009) provide similar perspec-
tives on the reasons for this instability. Bacchetta
and van Wincoop (2009) argue that small but per-
sistent changes in structural parameters of the
economy can produce very unstable expectations
that create unstable reduced-form relationships
between macro surprises and exchange rates over
time. Similarly, Sarno and Valente (2009) show
that modeling selection strategies for exchange
rate forecasting might perform poorly because
shifting market expectations changes the relative
importance of fundamentals over time. Faust et al.
(2007) dispute the practical importance of insta-
bility, however. Ignoring measurement error in
surprises, they find that nine announcements
are statistically significant determinants of either
the USD/DEM-EUR or USD/GBP in a 14-year
sample. They argue that coefficient instability is
not “a first order issue.” The relative macroeco-
nomic stability of their sample period might con-
tribute to this conclusion, however.
Although the announcement literature origi-
nally studied macroeconomic relations, it has also
taught us about microstructure, in particular the
role of order flow, announcement order/timing,
the speed of market reaction, and how informa-
tion is transmitted. One important contribution
of the microstructure literature is to reveal addi-
tional—indirect—channels through which
announcements can affect exchange rate returns.
Love and Payne (2008) and Evans and Lyons
(2008) take different econometric approaches
but both conclude that macro news substantially
affects exchange rate returns both directly and
indirectly, through order flow. Evans (2010)
emphasizes that this finding of substantial indi-
rect effects on returns helps to resolve (partially)
the puzzle that announced news directly explains
only a very small portion of exchange rate 
variation. 
The importance of an announcement surprise
depends on how it changes the market’s view of
the state of the economy. Because some groups
of announcements provide correlated informa-
tion, the order of announcements’ release is
important. Doukas (1985), Tandon and Urich
(1987), Andersen et al. (2003), and Ehrmann and
Fratzscher (2005) have all presented evidence
that earlier announcements within a correlated
group have a bigger impact on returns.
The initial research on the speed of price
adjustment confirmed the prediction of the
EMH that exchange rates should adjust very rap-
idly to scheduled releases (Ederington and Lee,
1995). Such a very rapid change will show up as
a price discontinuity (or jump), as found by
Andersen et al. (2003 and 2007) and Lahaye,
Laurent, and Neely (2009). On the other hand,
reactions to unscheduled announcements can
be slower. Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998)
found that markets reacted more quickly and
strongly to scheduled U.S. announcements than
to unscheduled German announcements. Reac  -
tions to scheduled announcements might be
quicker because agents have made contingent
plans to respond to the news. 
In contrast to Ederington and Lee’s (1995)
findings of very rapid adjustment to scheduled
news, Evans and Lyons’ (2005) study of order
flows and exchange rates suggests that there are
delayed systematic responses as announcements
prompt sustained trading that gradually recovers
part of the initial price impact. Evans and Lyons
(2005) argue that such effects would be small and
difficult to find with returns data alone; only
joint analysis of returns and order flow reveals it.
Evans (2010) discusses the possible role of risk
management in producing persistent responses of
exchange rates and order flow to macro surprises. 
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the direct response of exchange rates to announce-
ments because one can attribute almost all of an
exchange rate’s movement to the announcement
in a sufficiently small window around the
announcement.38 There is, however, a little-
discussed, practical tradeoff between data fre-
quency and sample length. Both higher-frequency
data and longer samples allow one to estimate
announcement effects more precisely, so longer
samples might substitute for high-frequency data.
Conversely, as the forecast horizon goes to
infinity, the uncertainty about the exchange rate
in the absence of an announcement becomes
arbitrarily large and therefore uncertainty about
the announcement effect likewise becomes arbi-
trarily large. Therefore one cannot know whether
announcement surprises have long-run effects.
In summary, researchers have learned a great
deal about how exchange rate returns react to
various announcements and how these reactions
vary with market policy expectations and insti-
tutional details such as scheduling. A number of
unresolved issues remain, however. What is the
extent of asymmetric reactions, by sign of shock
and by state of the business cycle, and what eco-
nomic behavior induces this asymmetry?
More recently, economists have begun to
investigate how public announcements precipi-
tate the release of private information that trading
impounds into prices. This line of research is still
in its early stages and many unresolved issues
remain. One area of potential progress would be
to use the data from announcement effects on
asset prices to inform more realistic structural
models of the macro determinants of asset prices. 
38 The conditional variance of a foreign exchange rate rises with the
forecast horizon, starting arbitrarily low at the shortest horizons
but eventually becoming arbitrarily high at long horizons. The
rise is linear for a homoskedastic variable.
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